Mixing addition modulo 2 n (+) and exclusive-or (⊕) has a host of applications in symmetric cryptography as the operations are fast and nonlinear over GF(2). We deal with a frequently encountered equation
Introduction
Addition modulo 2 n . Mixing addition modulo 2 n (+) with other Boolean operations such as exclusive-or (⊕), or (∨) and/or and (∧) is extensively used in symmetric cryptography. The main motivation for including addition mod 2 n in cryptographic primitives is that it is a nonlinear transformation over GF (2) and the operation is extremely fast on all present day architectures. Nonlinear transformations are of paramount importance in the design of ciphers as they make functions hard to invert. Helix [ Klimov and Shamir also used an update function for internal state, known as a T -function, where addition is mixed with multiplication and or in a certain fashion to achieve many useful properties of a secure stream cipher [KS04, KS03] .
Keeping with the trend of widespread use of addition in symmetric ciphers, there is a large body of literature that studies equations involving addition from many different angles. Staffelbach and Meier investigated the probability distribution of the carry for integer addition [SM90] . Wallén explained the linear approximations of modular addition [Wal03] . Lipmaa and Moriai [LM02] investigated the equation (x + y) ⊕ ((x ⊕ α) + (y ⊕ β)) = γ, where α, β are the input differences and γ is the output difference, to compute many differential properties. The dual of the above equation (x⊕y)+((x+α)⊕(y +β)) = γ was investigated for differential properties by Lipmaa et al. [LW + 04] . [BS91] , is one of the most powerful attacks against symmetric ciphers. There are broadly two lines of attacks based on DC. One is guessing input or output differences of a cipher with nontrivial probability. In a cipher that is secure against DC, input and output differences should behave 'pseudorandomly', so that none of them can be guessed from any known values with a nontrivial probability. This line of attack usually results in distinguishing attacks [YB + 04] . A second line of attack is much stronger but more difficult to implement than the other. It recovers secret information from known input and output differences, akin to the algebraic attacks [Mul04] . Note that this second line of attack implies the first but the converse is not true. Therefore, provable security against DC -introduced by Lai et al. [LM + 91] and first implemented by Nyberg and Knudsen [NK91] -remained a key factor in the evaluation of the security of a cipher. However, security of many complex modern ciphers against DC is hard to evaluate because of lack of theory to evaluate the security of its components. Our target is to mount a second line of attack (i.e., to recover secret information) on the much used symmetric cipher component addition modulo 2 n .
Differential Cryptanalysis (DC). Differential Cryptanalysis, introduced by Biham and Shamir
Results of the Paper. There are two basic addition equations under DC where differences of inputs and outputs are expressed as exclusive-or.
These equations are named differential equations addition (DEA). While engaged in cryptanalysis of MD5, Berson noted in 1992 that, for large n, it is hard to analyze modular addition when differences are expressed as XOR [Ber92] . This may have motivated the use of addition in conjunction with XOR in many symmetric ciphers to increase resistance against DC.
In this paper we show that the satisfiability of a randomly generated set of DEA is in the complexity class P. In other words, a Turing machine can show in O(n k ) time whether there exists a solution to an arbitrary set of DEA (n denotes the bit-length of x, y and k > 0 is an integer-valued constant computed from the degree of the polynomial (in n) by which the number of equations to be solved is bounded above). This result, on one hand, gives deeper insight into the behavior of addition under DC. On the other hand this leaves a cautionary note for the cryptographers to be more careful about using addition in the design. Outside cryptography, satisfiability of a system of equations has a natural appeal to many areas such as computational complexity, combinatorics, circuit optimization and computer algebra (remember the most famous NP-Complete satisfiability problem: Boolean formula satisfiability [CL + 90] ). For example, if a large system of DEA is NOT satisfiable then the whole circuit representing the system of DEA can be safely removed to optimize the circuit complexity. Going beyond the satisfiability problem, we also give an efficient algorithm to compute all the solutions to a randomly generated system of DEA with running time linear in the number of solutions. Another subtle but a noteworthy aspect of our work is the departure from the traditional technique for solving multivariate polynomial equations over GF (2) [AL95] . We heavily benefit from certain properties of DEA and solve such systems combinatorially.
Next, we extend our work to solve DEA in a crypto-friendly adaptive query model. The aim is to minimize the search space for the secret (x, y) using a minimum number of adaptive queries (α, β). Such an optimization problem -typically used to reduce data complexity of chosen plaintext attacks -for (1) has already been tackled by Muller [Mul04] . But an optimal solution has been elusive until now. We achieve optimal solutions for both of the equations. We show that a worst case lower bound on the number of queries (0, β) to solve (1) is (n − t − 1) where (n − t) > 1 with t being the bit-position of the least significant '1' of x. A worst case lower bound on the number of queries (α, β) to solve (2) is 3 for n > 2. Most importantly, for solving the above equations we also design algorithms whose upper bounds on the number of queries match worst case lower bounds. Note that our algorithm outperforms the previous best known algorithm by Muller to solve (1) -presented at FSE '04 -which required 3(n − 1) queries [Mul04] . Over and above, our results essentially close further investigation in this particular direction as the equations are solved with an optimal number of queries in the worst case. It is particularly interesting to note that, for (2) , although the number of all queries grows exponentially with the input size n, an optimal lower bound to solve (2) is 3 for all n > 2, i.e., constant asymptotically.
Our results on modular addition have the potential to be used either directly in the cryptanalysis of ciphers that include this special component or to facilitate cryptanalysis of several modern ciphers (e.g., mixing addition with multiplication). We show that, with a maximum of only 3 adaptively chosen queries, the search space of the secret of modular addition against DC can be reduced from 2 2n to only 4 for all n ≥ 1. We used our results to cryptanalyze a recently proposed cipher Helix [FW + 03] which was a candidate for consideration in the 802.11i standard. We are successful in reducing the data complexity of a DC attack on the cipher by a factor of 3 in the worst case (a factor of 46.5 in the best case) [Mul04] . In addition, using our algorithm to solve DEA, as discussed above we are able to compute all the differential properties of addition by investigating a single equation (note that the differential properties of addition have been independently found by Lipmaa and Moriai using a different technique [LM02] ).
Notation and Model of Computation
The purpose of the paper is to solve (1) and (2) for (x, y) using triples (α, β, γ) where x, y, α, β, γ ∈ Z n 2 . The ith bit of an n-bit integer l is denoted by l i (l 0 denotes the least significant bit or the 0th bit of l). The operation addition modulo 2 n over Z 2 n can be viewed as a binary operation over Z n 2 (we denote this operation by '+') using the bijection that maps (
The symbols '⊕' and '∧' denote the operations bit-wise exclusive-or and bit-wise and of two n-bit integers respectively. We will denote a ∧ b by ab. Throughout the paper, [p, q] denotes a set containing all integers between the integers p and q including both of them. Unless otherwise stated, n denotes a positive integer. The size of a set S is denoted by |S|.
The algorithms, described in this paper, can be implemented on a generic one-processor Random Access Machine (RAM) (i.e., instructions are executed sequentially) whose memory is composed of an unbounded sequence of registers each capable of containing an integer. Typically, RAM instructions consist of simple arithmetic operations (addition and bitwise XOR in our case), storing, addressing (direct and indirect) and branching, each of which is a constant time operation. However, the choice of RAM instructions is relatively less important because algorithms based on two reasonable sets of instructions will have the same asymptotic complexity. A detailed analysis of RAM can be found in [AH + , FB]. It can be shown that a polynomial-time solvable problem on a RAM is also polynomial-time solvable on a Turing Machine and vice versa.
2 Solving an Arbitrary System of DEA Our aim is to solve for (x, y) from the following set of differential equations of addition over Z n 2 ,
We observe that the ith bit of γ[k] can be written as
i and c i ,c i are computed from the following recursion,
Thus we see that γ [k] i is a function of the least (i + 1) bits of x, y, α [k] and β [k] . More formally,
Therefore, from a system of m differential equations of addition, a total of mn multivariate polynomial equations over GF (2) can be formed by ranging (k, i) through all values in (6). Plenty of research has been undertaken to design efficient ways to solve randomly generated multivariate polynomial equations. The classical Buchberger's Algorithm for generating Gröbner bases [AL95] and its variants [Fau99] are some of them. This problem is NP-complete (NPC) over GF (2) . Many other techniques such as relinearization [KS99] have been proposed to solve a special case of overdefined systems of multivariate polynomial equations. Note that, in our case, the number of unknowns and equations are 2n and mn respectively (if m > 2 then the system of equations is overdefined). However, taking full advantage of the specific nature of the differential equations of addition, we shall use a combinatorial technique to prove that, although the satisfiability of an arbitrary multivariate polynomial equation over GF(2) is NP-complete, this special cryptographically important subclass of equations is in the complexity class P (see [CL + 90] , [HM + 04] for definitions of NP, P, NPC). Finally, we also derive all the solutions to a system of such equations.
Computing the Character Set and the Useful Set
We call A the character set. Our first step is to transform the system of equations defined in (3) into a new set of equations over Z n 2 as defined below,
whereγ
. Now, we constructÃ,
We callÃ the useful set. Let all the solutions for (3) and (7) be contained in the sets A-satisfiable andÃ-consistent respectively. It is trivial to show that
Our aim is to computeÃ-consistent fromÃ.
Precomputation
Take an arbitrary element (α, β,γ) ∈Ã (n > 1). Observe thatγ i+1 can be computed using
, from the following three equations
where c i is the carry at the ith position of (x + y), Table 1 lists the values ofγ i+1 as computed from all values of 
Computation of Parameters G i , S i, 0 and S i, 1 from the Useful SetÃ
We now determine an important quantity, denoted by G i , for a nonempty useful setÃ. In G i , we store the ith and (i + 1)th bits ofγ and the ith bit of α and β for all (α, β,γ) ∈Ã. We call G i the ith core of the useful setÃ. More formally (suppose n > 1),
In the subsequent discussion we will often use the expression " Table 1 , find the row(s) of the fourth coordinateγ i+1 in the column specified by the first three coordinates (α i , β i ,γ i ) in R(0) and put them in set (10)). Now, from Table 1 ,
We assume m = |Ã| = O(n l ) for some nonnegative integer l. Then the time and memory to compute all G i 's and S i, j 's are O(n k ) each because the size of Table 1 and
. Now, we show a relation between S i, 0 and S i, 1 that will be used to obtain several results.
Proposition 1 For all nonempty useful setÃ and all
We set,
Satisfiability of DEA is in P
In this section, we deal with a decision problem: does there exist a solution for an arbitrary set of differential equations of addition, i.e., is a system of DEA satisfiable?
We have already seen how to compute the character set A, the useful setÃ, the core G i 's and S i 's from a system of DEA in O(n k ) (see Sect. 2.3). Now, we prove an important theorem that characterizes the membership inÃ-consistent which is, in fact, the solution set.
Theorem 1 Let the useful setÃ = φ and n > 1. The following two statements are equivalent.
Proof. From the construction of G i , it can be shown that 1 ⇔ 2.
Armed with the above theorem, we now formulate |Ã-consistent| (i.e., the number of solutions) in the following proposition which will later answer our satisfiability question.
Proposition 2 Let the useful setÃ
The S i 's are defined in (11).
Proof. We prove this result by considering all cases individually.
Case 1 Ifγ 0 = 1 for some (α, β,γ) ∈Ã then c 0 = 1 which is impossible.
Note that G k depends only on the least (k + 1) bits of x, y, α, β. We consider two subcases.
as
It is easy to show (a proof is by contradiction) that M l+1 , so calculated, gives the number of solutions for ((
as M 0 = S 0 . Note that, for all (α, β,γ) ∈Ã,γ is independent of (x n−1 , y n−1 ). Therefore,
Case 2(b): n = 2 . It is easy to show that S = 4 · S 0 if n = 2 .
Case 3 Ifγ 0 = 0, ∀(α, β,γ) ∈Ã and n = 1 . It is trivial to show that S = 4 if n = 1 since for all (α, β,γ) ∈Ã,γ is independent of (x n−1 , y n−1 ) .
Using Proposition 2, we now answer the question of satisfiability of DEA in the following claim. Verification of (i), (ii) and (iii) take time O(1), Θ(n) and O(1) respectively. Therefore, the overall time to decide whether a system of DEA is satisfiable is
Claim. (i) Ifγ
Thus the satisfiability of DEA is in P.
Computing All the Solutions to a System of DEA
Now the only part left unanswered is how to actually computeÃ-consistent, i.e., to extract all the solutions of a system of DEA which is satisfiable. Note, if n = 1 thenÃ-consistent comprises all 4 values of (x, y). The G i 's can be computed from the useful setÃ in O(n k ) (see Sect. 2.3). Now we compute an intermediate parameter Algorithm 1 Compute all the solutions to a system of satisfiable DEA Input:
The idea of the algorithm is to collect in
. Theorem 1 is the heart of the argument to prove that M is essentiallyÃ-consistent.
Time and Memory. Algorithm 1 takes time Θ(S) and memory Θ(n · S)
where S is the number of solutions (an explicit construction of M from the L i 's and its complexity analysis are shown in Appendix A.3).
Solving DEA in the Adaptive Query Model
In this section, we solve the equations
separately in an adaptive query model. Solving (15) in adaptive query model means solving a set of 2 2n equations generated by ranging (α, β) with the corresponding γ. The number of solutions satisfying 2 2n equations is less than that of any subset of the equations. Therefore, solving these 2 2n equations reduces the search space of the secret (x, y) to the minimum. This fact is the major motivation for dealing with this problem. The task of a computationally unbounded adversary is to select a subset A of all equations such that the solutions to the chosen subset A are the same as that of the entire 2 2n equations. The target of the adversary is to minimize |A|. A similar optimization problem can be asked of (16) where the number of equations is 2 n . Such an optimization problem for (16) has already been tackled by Muller [Mul04] in cryptanalysis of the Helix cipher but an optimal solution has still been elusive. We reach optimal solutions for both equations.
The Power of the Adversary
The power of an adversary that solves (15) is defined as follows.
1. An adversary has unrestricted computational power and an infinite amount of memory.
2. An adversary can only submit queries (α, β) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 to an honest oracle 2 which computes γ using fixed unknown (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 in (15) and returns the value to the adversary. We will often refer to that fixed (x, y) as the seed of the oracle.
Such an oracle with seed (x, y) is viewed as a mapping O xy : Z n 2 × Z n 2 → Z n 2 and defined by
An adversarial model, similar to the one described above for (15), can be constructed for (16) by setting (α, β) ∈ {0} n × Z n 2 and the mapping O xy : {0} n × Z n 2 → Z n 2 . The model described above represents a practical adaptively chosen message attack scenario where the adversary makes adaptive queries to an oracle. Based on the replies from the oracle, the adversary computes one or more unknown parameters.
The Task
O xy , defined in (17), generates a family of mappings
for (15). Therefore, D ∈ F is the character set with the number of equations m = 2 2n (see Sect. 2.1). Our aim is to find all (x, y) satisfying these 2 2n equations, i.e., to compute D-satisfiable from a subset of the character set D. If we deal with (16) then |D| = 2 n .
An Equivalent Task. From the character set D one can compute the useful setD using (8). Therefore, the task is equivalent to the determination ofD-consistent from a subset of the useful set D. We call D andD the total character set and the total useful set as their sizes are maximal and they are generated from a satisfiable set 2 2n DEA (because we assumed the oracle to be honest). Note that there is a bijection between D andD.
Adjusting the Oracle Output. If the oracle outputs γ on query (α, β), we shall consider the oracle output to beγ = α ⊕ β ⊕ γ for the sake of simplicity in the subsequent discussions.
Rules of the Game. Now we lay down the rules followed by the adversary to determine the setD-consistent that, in turn, gives the essence of the whole problem.
1. The adversary starts with no information about x and y except their size n.
2. The adversary settles on a strategy (i.e., a deterministic algorithm) which is publicly known.
Using the strategy, the adversary computes queries adaptively, i.e., based on the previous queries and the corresponding oracle outputs the next query is determined.
3. The game stops the moment the adversary constructsD-consistent. The adversary fails if she is unable to computeD-consistent for some (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 .
We search for an algorithm that determinesD-consistent for all (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 . Furthermore, there is an additional requirement that, in the worst case of (x, y), the number of queries required by the algorithm is the minimum . We shall elaborate on the meaning of worst case in Sect. 3.4 which focuses on worst case lower bounds on the number of queries.
Number of Solutions
In this section we are interested to determine the number of solutions of (15) and (16) in the adaptive query model. We have already developed a framework where the set of all solutions in the adaptive query model is denoted byD-consistent whereD is the total useful set. Therefore, formally, our effort will be directed to formulate |D-consistent|. We will see in Theorem 5 that, for (16), |D-consistent| depends on the least significant '1' of x. However, for (15), |D-consistent| = 4, ∀(x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 . We shall use these results in Theorem 5 and 6 of Sect. 3.4, to obtain lower bounds on the number of queries to computeD-consistent and in Sect. 3.5, to prove the correctness of our optimal algorithms.
Theorem 2 Let the position of the least significant '1' of x in the equation
(x + y) ⊕ (x + (y ⊕ β)) = γ be t and x, y, β, γ ∈ Z n 2 . Let the total useful setD be given. Then |D-consistent| is (i) 2 t+3 if n − 2 ≥ t ≥ 0, (ii) 2 n+1 otherwise.
Proof.
(i) n − 2 ≥ t ≥ 0. Using the procedure described in Sect. 2.3, we construct the ith core
, from the total useful setD. We derive that
In the above equations,
Note that only (18) is relevant if t = n − 2. The fact that we are able to extract only the first three coordinates of the elements of G i , ∀i ∈ [0, n − 2], can be proved using the following two auxiliary lemmas, the proofs of which are given in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 For all
(0, β,γ) ∈D,γ i = 0, ∀ i ∈ [0, t].
Lemma 2 For all
However, only the first three coordinates of the elements of the G i 's are sufficient to determine the S i 's (S i is defined in Sect. 2.3). It is easy to verify from Table 1 that S i = 2, ∀i ∈ [0, t] and
(ii) The proof is similar to the above one using Proposition 2.
Theorem 3 Let the total useful setD be given for the equation
Proof. Our approach is same as that of Theorem 2. Case 1: n ≥ 2. Corresponding to the total useful setD we determine
In the equations a 0 , b 
Case 2: n = 1. If n = 1 then |D-consistent| = 4. The proof is trivial using Proposition 2.
Worst Case Lower Bounds on the Number of Queries
Our target is to design an algorithm (for (15) or (16)) which computesD-consistent for all seeds (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 with adaptive queries. For such an algorithm, the number of required queries may vary with the choice of (x, y). In this section we concentrate on a lower bound on the number of queries in the worst case of (x, y) under the "rules of the game" stated in Sect. 3.2. The significance of the lower bound is that there exists no algorithm that requires less queries in the worst case than the obtained lower bound.
We already noticed that more queries tend to reduce the search space of the secret (x, y). In our formal framework, if A ⊆ B ⊆D thenD-consistent ⊆ B-consistent ⊆ A-consistent. This implies that |D-consistent| ≤ |B-consistent| ≤ |A-consistent|. Note that our algorithm constructs A ⊆D, ∀(x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 , using the submitted queries and the corresponding outputs such that |D-consistent| = |A-consistent|. The algorithm fails if |D-consistent| < |A-consistent|, for some (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 . We will use the condition -|A-consistent| cannot be strictly greater than |D-consistent| -to compute a lower bound on the number of queries in the worst case. In Theorem 4 we identify a property of A, in terms of the ith core G i , where the above condition is violated. In Theorem 5, we use this fact to obtain a lower bound.
Theorem 4 We consider the equation
where the position of the least significant '1' of x is t with n − 3 ≥ t ≥ 0. Let φ ⊂ A ⊆D andD be the total useful set of the equation. Let the (n − 3)th core G n−3 contain no element (0, β n−3 ,γ n−3 ,γ n−2 ) withγ n−2 = 1. 3 Then |A-consistent| = 2 t+3+k for some k > 0.
Proof. If G n−3 contains no element (0, β n−3 ,γ n−3 ,γ n−2 ) withγ n−2 = 1 then G n−2 contains no element (0, β n−2 ,γ n−2 ,γ n−1 ) withγ n−2 = 1 . Therefore, G n−2 is of one of the following forms,
Now, from Table 1, S n−2 = 2 l for either of the cases, where l > 0. Similarly, using Theorem 2,
In the following theorem, we partition the entire seed space Z n 2 × Z n 2 and compute a worst case lower bound for each partition. Note that a lower bound (say, l) for any partition shows that, for any algorithm that computesD-consistent ∀(x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 , there exists at least one seed in that particular partition which requires at least l queries.
Theorem 5 A lower bound on the number of queries (0, β) to solve
where n is the bit-length of x, y and t is the position of the least significant '1' of x.
Proof. For (i), (ii) and (iii) the lower bounds are trivial.
(iv) n − 2 ≥ t ≥ 0. Note that the submission of queries, generation of the useful set A and the core G i are the parts of an evolving process (i.e., with every submitted query (0, β), A, G i change). At any time, from the already submitted queries and the outputs, we can always construct A ⊆D and the ith core G i , ∀i ∈ [0, n − 2] whereD is the total useful set. Note that A-consistent contains all the solutions of the equations derived from the already submitted queries. We first divide the case into four disjoint subcases. Case 1: n − 5 ≥ t ≥ 0. By Theorem 4, a necessary condition is that ∃(0, β n−3 ,γ n−3 ,γ n−2 = 1) ∈ G n−3 otherwise |A-consistent| = 2 t+3+c > |D-consistent| = 2 t+3 (invoke Theorem 2).
We now define a quantity V n, t which denotes the set of all (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 such that the position of the least significant '1' of x is t (V n, t is a partition). We now define another quantity l (n, t) (k) for all k ∈ [t + 1, n − 2]. Let l (n, t) (k) denote a lower bound on the number of adaptively chosen queries to have (0, β i ,γ i ,γ i+1 = 1) ∈ G i for some i ∈ [k, n − 2] in the worst case of (x, y) ∈ V n, t . In other words, a worst case lower bound l (n, t) (k) means that, for any algorithm A there exists a seed (x, y) ∈ V n, t such that the adaptively chosen sequence of l (n, t) (k) − 1 queries (l (n, t) (k) > 0) by A for the seed (x, y) produces oracle outputsγ's withγ i+1 = 0, ∀ i ∈ [k, n − 2]). We will determine l (n, t) (n − 3) which is a lower bound in this case. For easy reading, in the rest of the proof, we shall denote l (n, t) (k) by l(k) .
Let p ∈ [t + 1, n − 3]. Now, for each algorithm, we always identify a seed (x, y) ∈ V n, t such that the adaptively chosen sequence of l(p) − 1 queries producesγ's withγ Table 1 , we construct (a, b), (a , b ) ∈ V n, t for each (x, y) in the following fashion. The carry bit at the jth position of (a + b) is c j and similarly c j .
(Construction of a and b) a
i = x i and b i = y i , ∀ i ∈ [0, p]. If c i = 0 set a i = 0, b i = 0, ∀ i ∈ [p + 1, n − 1]. If c i = 1 set a i = 1, b i = 1, ∀ i ∈ [p + 1, n − 1].
(Construction of a and b )
It can be shown from the portion of Table 1 -cut off by the rows R(1) and R(3) and the columns Col(1), Col(2), Col(3) and Col(4) -that seeds (a, b) and (a , b ) produce the same sequence of oracle outputs as (x, y) does on the selected sequence of l(p) − 1 queries. Now we consider each possible l(p)th query (0, β) and its outputγ for the seed (x, y). If  (β p+1 ,γ p+1 ) = (0, 1) then (a, b) (β p+1 ,γ p+1 ) = (0, 0) or (1, 0) then  both (a, b) and (a , b ) Therefore, either (a, b) or (a , b ) produces oracle outputs withγ i+1 = 0, ∀ i ∈ [p + 1, n − 2], for all the chosen l(p) queries.
Thus, we establish that, for any algorithm there exists a seed (x, y) ∈ V n, t such that the adaptively chosen sequence of l(p) queries produces oracle outputsγ's withγ i+1 = 0, ∀ i ∈ [p + 1, n − 2]. Therefore, a lower bound on the number of queries such that
Following the recursion,
The following lemma computes a value of l(t + 1). See Appendix A.2 for an elaborate proof.
Lemma 3 Let n − 4 ≥ t ≥ 0. For any algorithm A there exists a seed (x, y) ∈ V n, t such that the adaptively selected sequence of two queries by A for that particular seed produces oracle outputsγ's withγ
From Lemma 3, l(t + 1) = 3. Therefore, from (22), l(n − 3) = n − t − 1 . Case 2: n = t + 4, a worst case lower bound is 3. The proof follows from Lemma 3. Case 3: n = t + 3, a worst case lower bound is 2. The reason is, from Table 1 it is clear that, with only one query S n−2 > 1 which makes the number of solutions for this case greater than 2 t+3 which is impossible from Theorem 2. Case 4: n = t + 2, a worst case lower bound is 1 which is trivial.
Theorem 6 A lower bound on the number of queries (α, β) to solve
Proof. To prove (i), we consider all possible adaptively chosen two queries by all algorithms and find that, in each case, an oracle can always select a seed such that the number of solutions obtained from the outputs exceeds 4 which is impossible by Theorem 3. A detailed analysis is given in Appendix A.4. The proofs for (ii) and (iii) are trivial.
Optimal Algorithms
In this section, we concentrate on designing algorithms that solve (16) and (15) in the adaptive query model. In the formal framework, if the oracle is seeded with an unknown (x, y) then there is always a total useful setD that the unknown seed (x, y) generates. For a particular total useful setD, there exists a setD-consistent containing all values of (x, y). Our algorithm makes adaptive queries (α, β) to the oracle -which is already seeded with a fixed (x, y) -and the oracle returns γ. The task of the algorithm is to computeD-consistent using oracle outputsγ, for all seeds (x, y) ∈ Z n 2 × Z n 2 . The algorithm is optimal if the number of queries in the worst case (i.e., the upper bound) matches the lower bound derived in the relevant theorem (Theorem 5 or 6). Optimal algorithms to solve (16) and (15) are presented in Algorithm 2 and 3. Below we discuss the intuition behind the algorithms; while we omit many trivial details, the pseudocode covers all cases. 
Discussion: Algorithm 2(sketch). The inputs to Algorithm 2 are an oracle O (which is set with the unknown seed and computesγ), n denoting the size of the unknowns and the precomputed Table 1 denoted by the variable T . The output of Algorithm 2 is a set of lists. This set contains the L i 's -the ith bit solution for all i ∈ [0, n − 2] -similar to the ones computed in Sect. 2.5. The objective of Algorithm 2 is to correctly compute the L i 's for the useful setD. The computed L i 's will be given to Algorithm 1 which computes all the individual solutions.
Algorithm 2 works in a way that at first G i 's are computed from the submitted queries such that the number of solutions for them is the same as that for all 2 n queries. Then the L i 's are computed from the G i 's (Step 28). First, we find t, the position of the least significant '1' of x, by making the first query (0, β) with β composed of all 1's (Step 3, 10). Once the position of the least significant '1' of x is known, we can immediately compute G i , ∀i ∈ [0, t], by invoking Lemma 1 (Step 11 to 13). We see that S i = 2, ∀i ∈ [0, t]. This result readily determines that S i = 1, ∀i ∈ [t + 1, n − 1] (see Theorem 2) . To compute G i , ∀i ∈ [t + 1, n − 2] we will use a nice pattern observable in Table 1 . Consider Col (3) and Col (4) of the Table 1 . Observe no two rows, contained in these two columns, are identical. Therefore, if for some queries G i contains two elements of the form (0, 1, 0, a) and  (0, 1, 1, b) then the corresponding S i = 1. Therefore, the aim of Algorithm 2 is to submit queries such that G i contains elements of the form (0, 1, 0, a) and (0, 1, 1, b) , for all i ∈ [t + 1, n − 2]. Another interesting pattern of Table 1 is that each row, cut off by Col 2, Col 3 and Col 4, has at least one '1'. The algorithm uses this fact to get oracle outputγ withγ i = 1 if required (Step 25). However, it is always easy to get an oracle outputγ withγ i = 0 by setting the least i bits of β to zero (Step 15 and 21) . Note that the algorithm submits the first two queries in Steps 3 and 15. In the loop (from steps 19 to 27) one of the two previous queries is modified to get '0' or '1' at the required locations of the output. Thus we get G i , ∀i ∈ [t + 1, n − 2], for which S i = 1. Therefore, invoking Theorem 2, we get the number solutions for the submitted queries is 2 t+3 (omitting many trivial cases). This proves the correctness of Algorithm 2. It can be easily verified from Theorem 5 that the number of queries used by Algorithm 2 is worst case optimal.
Discussion: Algorithm 3 (sketch). The basic idea of Algorithm 3 is the same as that of Algorithm 2, i.e., we compute the L i 's for the total useful setD. But here we use a different trick to optimize the number of queries. Note that, for all i ∈ [0, n − 2], S i = 1 for (15) (see Theorem 3).
We first submit two queries as shown in Step 3 and 5. For these two queries Table 1 ).
then we are done (Step 11). A combinatorial pattern in the precomputed Table 1 
Cryptographic Applications
Weakness of modular addition under DC. The fact that an arbitrary system of DEA is in the complexity class P, shows a major differential weakness of modular addition which is one of the most used block cipher components. The weakness is more alarming because, with a maximum of only 3 adaptively chosen queries the search space of the secret can be reduced from 2 2n to only 4 for all n ≥ 1 (see Theorem 3 and Algorithm 3). It is, however, not known at this moment, how much influence this weakness has on many modern symmetric ciphers that mix other nonlinear operations with addition. Still, a recommendation for a deeper analysis of ciphers mixing XOR and modular addition in the light of our investigation is well justified. , is a stream cipher with a combined MAC functionality. The primitive uses combination of addition and XOR to generate pseudorandom bits. Recently a differential attack was found against Helix by Muller [Mul04] . He solved the equation (x + y) ⊕ (x + (y ⊕ β)) = γ many times to recover secret information (x, y) using β and the corresponding γ. Every time β corresponds to a chosen plaintext. His algorithm uses 3(n − 1) queries every time. Therefore, the most natural challenge, from an algorithmic point of view, is to reduce the number of queries and if possible to attain an optimality. For the Helix output word n = 32 bits, 93 queries were needed whereas Algorithm 2 takes at most 31 queries if the position of the least significant '1' of x (denoted by t) is zero. Note that, if t > 0 then the number of queries is less. However, the most important fact is that the number of queries cannot be further reduced in the worst case as our algorithm is worst case optimal. This fact can be straightaway used to reduce the data complexity of that particular attack on Helix cipher by, at least, a factor of 3. However, in the best case, there exists seed (x, y), ∀ t ∈ [0, n − 3], for which (16) can be solved by Algorithm 2 with only 2 queries and the improvement in such a case is a factor of 46.5.
Computing Differential Properties of Addition. It is easy to show that our algorithm to solve a randomly generated set DEA is robust enough to compute all differential properties of addition (e.g., maximal differential, impossible differential, etc.) In such a case we need to consider a single differential equation of addition instead of many and then compute the solutions to it. For example, if the single equation is NOT satisfiable then this is an impossible differential. However, the differential properties of addition has been independently studied in depth by Lipmaa and Moriai using a different approach [LM02] .
Conclusion and Further Research
The results of the paper have impacts on both theory and practice. We have shown the importance of solving DEA from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. The paper seals any further search to improve lower bounds on the number of queries for solving DEA with adaptive queries. Although the total number of queries grows exponentially, an optimal lower bound is linear for one of them and constant for the other. Moreover, our algorithm reduces the number of queries of the previous best known algorithm and our results improve the data complexity of an attack on Helix cipher. Our work leaves room for further research, particularly, in the direction of solving DEA with nonadaptive queries. Last but not the least, our solution techniques motivate further research to solve more complex equations that mix modular addition, exclusive-or, modular multiplication and T -functions.
